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THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF TEXTUALISM FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCACY
CANAAN SUITT*

INTRODUCTION
“Gorsuch?”1 The incredulity of this question captures many observers’ reactions on June 15, 2020, the day the Supreme Court of the United
States delivered a landmark victory to LGBTQ employees in Bostock v.
Clayton County.2 The six to three lineup of Justices was surprising given
the Court’s ideological composition—five conservatives and four liberals.3
Even more surprising was the opinion’s author—President Donald Trump’s
first appointee to the Court, Neil Gorsuch.4 Gorsuch was nominated by
President Trump for his sterling conservative credentials5 and was lauded
by social conservatives who saw his nomination as a victory for their favored causes, including religious liberty and anti-abortion measures.6 The
shock of Bostock was that Gorsuch delivered a major victory for a cause,
namely LGBTQ rights, that is strongly disfavored by a major constituency that pushed for his appointment.
The method of constitutional interpretation by which Gorsuch
brought about the progressive victory—textualism—sparked debate and
*

JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2022; MAR, Yale Divinity School, 2018.
Robert Barnes, Neil Gorsuch? The Surprise Behind the Supreme Court’s Surprising
LGBTQ Decision, WASH. POST (June 16, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/poli
tics/courts_law/neil-gorsuch-gay-transgender-rights-supreme-court/2020/06/16/112f903c
-afe3-11ea-8f56-63f38c990077_story.html [https://perma.cc/YPQ4-TE2T].
2
Id.; see also Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1734 (2020).
3
See Julie Moreau, Supreme Court’s LGBTQ Ruling Could Have ‘Broad Implications,’
Legal Experts Say, NBC NEWS (June 23, 2020, 4:40 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com
/feature/nbc-out/supreme-court-s-lgbtq-ruling-could-have-broad-implications-legal-n12
31779 [https://perma.cc/FLZ2-PK3T].
4
Barnes, supra note 1; see Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Mark Landler, Trump Nominates
Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/01/31/us/politics/supreme-court-nominee-trump.html [https://perma.cc/JZS6-WSEC].
5
See Andrew Walker, Social Conservatives Should Rally Around Neil Gorsuch, THE
FEDERALIST (Jan. 31, 2017), https://thefederalist.com/2017/01/31/social-conservatives
-rally-around-neil-gorsuch/ [https://perma.cc/L8QM-L9QT].
6
See Callum Borchers, Trump’s Nomination of Neil Gorsuch Is a Promise Kept to Conservative Media, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the
-fix/wp/2017/01/31/trumps-nomination-of-neil-gorsuch-is-a-promise-kept-to-conservative
-media/ [https://perma.cc/C7ML-NTSW].
1
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speculation among commentators across the ideological spectrum.7 Championed by the late Justice Antonin Scalia,8 whom Gorsuch replaced on the
Court following a prolonged vacancy,9 textualism is an interpretive method
that at its core looks to the text of the law to determine the law’s meaning.10 Though Justice Elena Kagan, a liberal, famously stated at Harvard’s 2015 Scalia Lecture that “we’re all textualists now”11—a declaration
seemingly confirmed by Bostock—textualism is historically connected
with conservative legal values of judicial restraint and fidelity to the
Constitution.12 While some fellow textualists were dismayed by Gorsuch’s
reasoning in Bostock—including Justice Samuel Alito, who warned in
dissent that Gorsuch’s opinion was like a pirate ship sailing under a textualist flag but really advancing society’s current values13—other textualists cheered the decision as a straightforward triumph for the method.14
Other Bostock commentators saw the possibility of something
more significant in the opinion. Might textualism be used as a tool to advance other progressive causes? Even before Bostock, reeling under the
impacts of President Donald Trump’s fast-paced appointments to the federal judiciary,15 commentators had urged lawyers advancing liberal causes
to become savvy with originalist and textualist arguments—in other words,
to begin speaking the language of the new judicial landscape.16 This strategy seemed validated by the ruling in Bostock. The thinking goes that if
7

See Jared Odessky & Leigh Thomas, Commentary Roundup: Bostock v. Clayton County,
ONLABOR (June 16, 2020), https://www.onlabor.org/commentary-round-up-bostock-v-clay
ton-county/ [https://perma.cc/3JA2-LJWA].
8
See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Legacy of Justice Scalia and His Textualist Ideal, 85 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 857, 858 (2017).
9
Amy Howe, Senate Confirms Gorsuch, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 7, 2017, 1:33 PM), https://
www.scotusblog.com/2017/04/senate-confirms-gorsuch/ [https://perma.cc/9K7T-DAAA].
10
See infra notes 32–37 and accompanying text.
11
See Roy T. Englert Jr., On Textualism, Sex Discrimination and Clean Water, NAT’L L.J.
(July 18, 2019, 3:58 PM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/07/18/on-textual
ism-sex-discrimination-and-clean-water/ [https://perma.cc/2Z72-A5E3].
12
See infra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
13
See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1755–56 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
14
See, e.g., Ilya Shapiro, After Bostock, We’re All Textualists Now, CATO INST. (June 15,
2020), https://www.cato.org/commentary/after-bostock-were-all-textualists-now [https://
perma.cc/8LHR-WRMF].
15
See Rebecca R. Ruiz et al., A Conservative Agenda Unleashed on the Federal Courts,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/14/us/trump-appeals-court
-judges.html [https://perma.cc/2KY9-7863].
16
See Richard L. Hasen, Liberals Must Embrace a Bankrupt Judicial Philosophy to Have
Any Chance of Winning at the Supreme Court, SLATE (Oct. 18, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://
slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/10/originalism-textualism-supreme-court-liberal-strat
egy.html [https://perma.cc/WB4A-KQ9K].
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textualist arguments, favored by conservatives, had worked to advance
a cause disfavored by conservatives in Bostock, there might be broader
application of the textualist strategy for advancing traditionally progressive or liberal causes before conservative judges.
One proposal of this sort is related to environmental advocacy.
For example, Ann E. Carlson wrote that Gorsuch’s textualist rationale
in Bostock could be used by environmental advocates in efforts to persuade the Court to endorse a broad interpretation of the Clean Air Act.17
According to Carlson, a textualist interpretation of the Act would place
regulation of greenhouse gasses by the Environmental Protection Agency
firmly within its extent.18
This Note argues that a reliance on textualist arguments to win
environmental victories from conservative judges in the new judicial landscape involves a simplistic view of judicial decision-making, according to
which a method of constitutional or statutory interpretation is dispositive
of a given ruling. Methods of interpretation interact with other factors,
including judges’ ideological and institutional commitments, in determining cases. Textualism is a method of constitutional interpretation favored
by conservative judges, but it is also part of a broader suite of conservative
commitments and attitudes that complicate the role of textualism and
may counteract textualism’s perceived benefit for environmental causes.
The upshot is that a strong focus on textualism as a way to cope in the new
judicial landscape may do more harm than good for the goal of environmental advocacy.
This Note proceeds in the following way. Part I addresses the question of why textualism has become a subject of great interest for both
conservative and liberal legal advocates. Appointing judges with sterling
conservative credentials has been a central aim of the modern conservative
legal movement that dates from the 1980s.19 A commitment to originalism and textualism is a key litmus test for these conservative judges.20
17

John Schwartz & Geneva Abdul, How a Ruling on Gay and Transgender Rights May
Help the Climate, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/cli
mate/how-a-ruling-on-gay-and-transgender-rights-may-help-the-climate.html [https://
perma.cc/6SWB-HFPZ].
18
Id.; see also Ann Carlson, What Does Today’s Decision Holding that Employers Can’t
Discriminate Against LGBTQ Employees Have to Do with Climate Change?, LEGALPLANET
(June 15, 2020), https://legal-planet.org/2020/06/15/what-does-todays-decision-holding
-that-employers-cant-discriminate-against-lgbtq-employees-have-to-do-with-climate
-change/ [https://perma.cc/XE78-D2XQ].
19
See infra Section I.B.
20
See infra notes 46–51 and accompanying text.
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In the Trump administration, the conservative legal movement saw great
success in appointing conservative judges to the U.S. federal judiciary.21
This success confronted liberals with strategic questions of how to proceed
in the new conservative judicial landscape.22 In this context, textualism
was discussed as a strategy for success. Part II critiques this strategy. First,
there is a theoretical argument against the usefulness of textualism for
scoring victories for causes disfavored by conservatives. Textualism’s
appeal in the new judicial landscape is that it is a supposedly non-partisan
legal tool that can be used to persuade partisan-opponent judges. This
thinking buys into one of the key rationales for textualism, i.e., the idea
that textualism inherently promotes judicial restraint and fidelity to the
law. However, textualism does not bar judicial activism or ideological
influence; to the contrary, it easily functions as a conduit of such activism
and ideology. Second, textualism as a method of interpretation favored by
conservative judges is part of a broader set of commitments that judges
bring into cases. In the context of environmental advocacy, there is evidence of general conservative skepticism to environmental causes.23 More
importantly, opposition to the regulatory state is another key litmus test
for judges appointed in the Trump administration, and opposition to
environmental causes can be a proxy for opposition to the regulatory state.
Third, the record of textualist judges on the environment is not promising. The Conclusion considers alternatives to a textualist strategy. While
there is certainly no reason to abandon textualist arguments, relying on
textualism as a silver bullet can be counterproductive and lead to complacency. More systemic solutions are needed for lasting environmental
victories in the federal courts.
I.

WHY TEXTUALISM? WHY NOW?

Why has textualism, seemingly a dry academic theory of statutory
interpretation, become a focal point of discussions about the state of the
U.S. federal judiciary and political landscape, spilling out of academic
contexts into mainstream discourse? The reason for textualism’s “moment” is twofold. On the one hand, textualism is a theory that has been
strongly advanced by theorists and advocates in the modern conservative
legal movement. Former Justice Antonin Scalia stands out as the pioneer
21

See infra notes 56–80 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 81–89 and accompanying text.
23
See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
22
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in this respect.24 On the other hand, as the modern conservative legal
movement has been successful in stocking the federal judiciary with
conservative judges, commentators (whether friends or enemies) have
had to take note of what these conservative judges believe, how they approach cases, and what this means for various legal causes. During the
Trump administration, many staunch conservative judges were appointed
to the federal judiciary, making this issue especially pertinent. This Part
considers the successes of the conservative legal movement during the
Trump administration and why textualism was latched onto as a strategy in response to this situation.
A.

Textualism and Conservatism

If it is true that “we’re all textualists now,” as Justice Kagan stated
in 2015,25 this was not always the case. Historically, the Supreme Court
and lower federal courts have used a variety of sources and methods to
interpret statutes,26 including a consideration of legislative intent, purpose, and policy.27 This pluralism of sources and interpretive methods
was sometimes portrayed as theoretical disarray, as when Henry Hart
and Albert Sacks remarked in 1958, “American courts have no intelligible,
generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation.”28 Indeed, as Margaret H. Lemos has argued, it is still true that
in practice judges use an eclectic blend of interpretive strategies depending on the case at hand, notwithstanding an increased obsession within
legal academia with finding the one true interpretive method.29 Nevertheless, Kagan’s statement accurately reflects the fact that textualism is
now widespread but that it did not always occupy its current position of
influence.30 Furthermore, the context of Kagan’s remark—the Scalia lecture at Harvard University—points to the key factor in textualism’s
ascendancy: influential advocates, like former Justice Scalia, who campaigned for its use.31
24

See Jesse D.H. Snyder, How Textualism Has Changed the Conversation in the Supreme
Court, 48 U. BALT. L. REV. 413, 419 (2019).
25
Id. at 413.
26
See id. at 416.
27
See Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 849, 856 (2014).
28
See id. at 855.
29
Id.
30
See Siegel, supra note 8, at 858.
31
Id.
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As Jonathan Siegel observes, there are different degrees of textualism.32 One might think that the statutory text itself should be an important or even the most important factor in statutory interpretation, and
yet also think that other factors such as legislative history, purpose, or
policy should weigh in as well.33 In this sense of textualism, which merely
foregrounds the importance of the text, one can be a textualist even if one
uses non-textualist arguments.34 This would seem to be the case with
Kagan, for example, who recognizes the text’s importance and therefore
describes herself as a textualist but is not thereby opposed or foreclosed
to other interpretive strategies.35 But there is a more stringent version
of textualism according to which the text is the law, and statutory analysis must not only begin but also end with considering what the text says,
without going beyond it.36 It is this more demanding sense that captures
the textualism of Scalia.37
Textualism in this more demanding sense—along with its counterpart in constitutional interpretation, originalism—was forged by conservatives in opposition to the perceived judicial activism of the Warren and
Burger courts of the 1960s and 1970s.38 According to conservative critics,
liberal judges of the era acted in a way that was essentially lawless.39 That
is, rather than being constrained by the law, these judges injected their
own political preferences into legal decisions, speaking where the law was
silent, effectively legislating from the bench.40 For conservative critics,
this practice was tantamount to an attack on the rule of law.41 Furthermore, Scalia and others contended there was no reliable interpretive
method available to constrain these activist judges.42 A strong textualism
that begins and ends with the statutory text was put forward as an
antidote to the perceived rampant subjectivism and activism of judges.43
32

Id. at 859.
See id.
34
See id.
35
See id.
36
Siegel, supra note 8, at 859.
37
Id.
38
See Lemos, supra note 27, at 853; see also Whitley Kaufman, The Truth About Originalism,
9 PLURALIST 39, 49 (2014).
39
See DAVID A. STRAUSS & GEOFFREY R. STONE, DEMOCRACY AND EQUALITY: THE ENDURING
CONSTITUTIONAL VISION OF THE WARREN COURT 2 (2019).
40
See Catherine Cook, Legislating from the Bench, HARV. POL. REV. (Mar. 3, 2009), https://
harvardpolitics.com/legislating-from-the-bench/ [https://perma.cc/G7UX-7PHP].
41
See STRAUSS & STONE, supra note 39, at 2–3.
42
See Lemos, supra note 27, at 856–57.
43
Id. at 859–60.
33
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Fidelity and restraint were the core values of this new methodology.44 By
using textualist methods, judges could go as far as the law allows and no
further, avoid inserting their own ideological preferences, and advance
the rule of law.45
Thus, textualism was advanced by conservative theorists as an
alternative method of restraint to perceived liberal overreach. Alongside
the ascendancy of textualism and its counterpart originalism, the modern
conservative legal movement grew in numbers and gained institutional
influence through the decades-long effort of groups like the Federalist
Society.46 Indeed, the ascendancy of textualism should be understood in
terms of the concomitant growth and institutional strength of legal conservatism. The connection is that thinkers within the conservative legal
movement embraced and advanced textualism, so that as the movement
grew in influence, so did textualism.47 Of course, as Lemos and others
have argued, it would be inaccurate to say that there is an inherent or
inevitable connection between textualism and conservatism.48 This Note
agrees with that point—theoretically, textualism is not inherently conservative. It is possible to imagine an alternative timeline in which textualism
as a method of statutory interpretation became associated with liberalism due to its historically contingent connections with liberal thinkers
and causes.49 As it is, textualism is in fact tied by contingent connections
such as political movements and campaigns to conservatism.50 While there
is nothing inherently conservative about textualism from a theoretical
point of view, from a recent historical standpoint, textualism has been advanced and has achieved widespread influence within conservative political
circles and, importantly, it is often found in connection with other conservative values and commitments.51 Hence, notwithstanding the contingency
of the connection between textualism and conservatism, the connection

44

See Kaufman, supra note 38, at 40, 43.
See Lemos, supra note 27, at 895.
46
See Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, How the Federalist Society Became the De Facto
Selector of Republican Supreme Court Justices, SLATE (Jan. 31, 2017, 10:12 AM), https://
slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/01/how-the-federalist-society-became-the-de-facto-se
lector-of-republican-supreme-court-justices.html [https://perma.cc/L5DG-ZCEV].
47
See Lemos, supra note 27, at 891.
48
Id. at 853.
49
It is also worth noting that there are theorists who have attempted to retool textualism
for progressive causes. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The
Promise of the New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1527–28 (2011).
50
See Lemos, supra note 27, at 891.
51
Id.
45
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is real. This Note therefore avoids debates about the inherent political
valence of textualism as a method and focuses on the fact that textualism
is a method inextricably tied with the rise of modern legal conservatism.
B.

Creating a Conservative Judiciary

While one of the central goals of textualism was to cabin judicial
activism with a principled method committed to restraint and the rule
of law, one of the central aims of the modern conservative legal movement is to build up a pool of conservative judicial candidates to reshape
the federal judiciary in conservatism’s image.52 At the time of the conservative legal movement’s inception in the 1980s, there were relatively few
pedigreed conservative judges.53 Additionally, thanks in part to the less
extreme political polarization of the era, Republican presidents such as
Nixon and Reagan still appointed judges with liberal viewpoints, using
factors other than ideological purity to select nominees.54 As conservatism
moved further to the right ideologically, the explicit aim of organizations
like the Federalist Society was to make up for the dearth of qualified conservative judicial candidates.55
Some of the conservative legal movement’s greatest successes
have come in the last few years during the Trump administration. One
of then-candidate Trump’s main campaign promises in 2016 was to put
conservative judges on the federal courts—to “appoint judges very much in
the mold of Justice Scalia,” as Trump put it at the second Presidential debate.56 To assuage those who had doubts about Trump’s conservative bona
fides in 2016, Trump released a list of eleven potential Supreme Court
nominees,57 a practice he repeated in his 2020 campaign.58 Reviewing the

52

See Baum & Devins, supra note 46.
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
See Jeremy Kidd, New Metrics and the Politics of Judicial Selection, 70 ALA. L. REV.
785, 788 (2019).
57
Amber Phillips, Who are the 11 People on Donald Trump’s Short List for the Supreme
Court?, WASH. POST (May. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp
/2016/05/18/who-are-the-11-people-on-donald-trumps-short-list-for-the-supreme-court
/?postshare=3241463601459681 [https://perma.cc/V2NN-M9XS].
58
Amy Howe, Trump Releases New List of Potential Supreme Court Nominees, SCOTUS
BLOG (Sept. 9, 2020, 6:18 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/09/trump-releases-new
-list-of-potential-supreme-court-nominees/ [https://perma.cc/6EZK-ATLA].
53
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2016 list, Shannen Coffin, counsel to former Vice President Dick Cheney,
approvingly summed up: “These are people who share a common concern
for approaching the Constitution as written, not making it up as you go
along. They wouldn’t be imposing their own judgments on interpretations.”59 Yet if some, like Coffin, praised Trump’s list of judges because
the picks would show restraint, other social conservatives praised the list
because the judges would be advocates for religious liberty and other
conservative causes.60 Thus, whether the promise of restraint or advocacy
allured, conservatives and those for whom Supreme Court nominees was
the most important issue overwhelmingly supported Trump.61
And it turned out that President Trump made good on this prom62
ise. In doing so, he dramatically reshaped the federal judiciary.63 Of
course, President Trump did not work alone. The successes were in part
the result of Republicans having both the Presidency and the Senate, as
well as Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s willingness to dispense
with the judicial filibuster,64 and thus the Republicans’ ability to appoint
judges without meaningful resistance from the Democratic Party.65 Indeed,
Senate Majority Leader McConnell made it a central goal to appoint
judges.66 Even as Trump lost re-election to Joseph Biden in the Presidential Election of November 3, 2020,67 entering into “lame duck” status,
59

Ben Kamisar & Lydia Wheeler, Trump Soothes the Right with List of Supreme Court
Picks, THE HILL (May 18, 2016, 8:04 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential
-races/280381-trump-unveils-list-of-11-potential-supreme-court-nominees [https://perma
.cc/98RP-LUMT].
60
See Borchers, supra note 6.
61
See Ramesh Ponnuru, Why Conservatives Care More About the Supreme Court, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 23, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-09-23
/why-conservatives-care-more-than-liberals-about-supreme-court-politics [https://perma
.cc/XKD2-XZPN].
62
See Ruiz et al., supra note 15.
63
Id.
64
Leigh Ann Caldwell, Republicans Use ‘Nuclear Option’ to Clear the Way for Gorsuch
Confirmation, NBC NEWS (Apr. 6, 2017, 2:52 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/con
gress/senate-democrats-block-neil-gorsuch-s-supreme-court-nomination-n743326
[https://perma.cc/6J2X-HRP3].
65
See Li Zhou, Democrats’ Very Limited Options for Stopping Mitch McConnell’s Judicial
Onslaught, VOX (Nov. 14, 2018, 2:35 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/11/14/18016022
/mcconnell-judicial-nominees-democrats [https://perma.cc/DMX4-6E23].
66
Susan Davis & Kelsey Snell, Mitch McConnell On Filling The Federal Bench: ‘This Is
My Top Priority’, NPR (May 24, 2018, 7:54 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/05/24/61422
8261/mitch-mcconnell-on-filling-the-federal-bench-this-is-my-top-priority [https://perma
.cc/5VHE-GKT4].
67
Jonathan Martin & Alexander Burns, Biden Wins Presidency, Ending Four Tumultuous
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Republicans pushed forward with judicial confirmations, “breaking a
123-year tradition against voting on judicial nominees of an outgoing
President of the defeated Party during a lame duck session.”68 The upshot of this effort was that at the end of President Trump’s term, the
Republican-controlled Senate had confirmed fifty-four of President Trump’s
nominees to the federal courts of appeal (just one less than President
Obama appointed in his eight years), or nearly one-third of federal appellate judges.69 Additionally, President Trump appointed 174 federal
district court judges.70 By appointing so many judges, President Trump,
among other things, flipped two traditionally liberal circuits—the Second71
and Ninth72—to Republican-appointed majorities. On the Supreme Court,
President Trump appointed three Justices during his four years: Neil
Gorsuch,73 Brett Kavanaugh,74 and Amy Coney Barrett.75 With Barrett’s
confirmation to the Court on October 26, 2020, the Court shifted further
rightward with a strong six to three conservative majority.76

Years Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES (April 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/07/us
/politics/biden-election.html [https://perma.cc/8YLX-CG7R].
68
Madison Alder, Trump, GOP Defy Precedent with Lame Duck Judicial Appointees (1),
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 18, 2020, 6:06 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/trump
-gop-defy-precedent-with-lame-duck-judicial-confirmations [https://perma.cc/8SXU-S9R9].
69
Lawrence Hurley, On Guns, Abortion and Voting Rights, Trump Leaves Lasting Mark
on U.S. Judiciary, REUTERS (Jan. 15, 2021, 6:52 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us
-usa-trump-judges/on-guns-abortion-and-voting-rights-trump-leaves-lasting-mark-on-u-s
-judiciary-idUSKBN29K162 [https://perma.cc/EMZ4-BXJQ].
70
Id.
71
Madison Alder, Trump Flips New York–Based 2nd Circuit as Menashi Confirmed (2),
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 14, 2019, 6:32 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/trump
-flips-new-york-based-second-circuit-as-menashi-confirmed [https://perma.cc/7292-QPZ9].
72
Maura Dolan, Trump Has Flipped the 9th Circuit—and Some New Judges Are Causing
a ‘Shock Wave’, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2020, 7:06 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california
/story/2020-02-22/trump-conservative-judges-9th-circuit [https://perma.cc/NSJ3-DS7Q].
73
Adam Liptak & Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed by Senate as Supreme
Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics
/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/5CM3-JK5X].
74
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kavanaugh Is Sworn in After Close Confirmation Vote in Senate,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh
-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/8MHN-Y936].
75
Nicholas Fandos, Senate Confirms Barrett, Delivering for Trump and Reshaping the
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/26/us/politics/senate
-confirms-barrett.html [https://perma.cc/94JR-BK4J].
76
Nicholas Wu & Christal Hayes, Amy Coney Barrett Confirmed to the Supreme Court,
Giving Conservatives a 6–3 Majority, USA TODAY (Oct. 27, 2020, 8:47 AM), https://www
.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/10/26/amy-coney-barrett-senate-vote-con
firm-judge-supreme-court/3741746001/ [https://perma.cc/77ZB-KG9Z].
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President Trump frequently touted his conservative overhaul of
the federal judiciary as one of his defining achievements.77 For a deeply
polarizing figure like President Trump, Trump’s assessment of his success
with judicial appointments seems to be something that everyone, friend
and enemy, could agree on. Even though Trump lost re-election, the impact
of his judicial appointments will last for decades.78 Indeed, the staying
power of the judiciary—lifetime appointments—is one of the key motivations for the Republican Party.79 Even if the Republican Party loses power
at the federal level—as it did in 2020 across the board, judges remain
and can shape law and policy for a generation.80
C.

The Environmentalist Response

Environmental advocates immediately saw the significance of
President Trump’s reshaping of the federal judiciary for environmental
protections.81 Judicial appointments were not the only concern. Over the
course of his tenure, President Trump eliminated over 100 environmental rules aimed at protecting the environment.82 Many of these rollbacks
were of Obama-era policies and were carried out by the Environmental
Protection Agency.83 The extent of these rollbacks was unprecedented and
deeply concerning to environmental advocates.84 Nevertheless, there was
the possibility of these rollbacks being reversed and a new course taken—
indeed, this is precisely what happened with the new Biden administration,
which immediately initiated review of Trump-era rollbacks.85 President
77
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Trump’s judicial appointments, however, cannot be so easily undone.
Environmental lawyers began to realize that the reshaping of the judiciary
could be more significant in its scope and impact than the rollbacks.86
Against this dire backdrop, strategies for navigating the new legal
landscape became pressing. Michael Allan Wolf, for example, advised
environmental advocates to advance conservative legal principles—e.g.,
federalism—in their arguments if they hope to find success in the current
judicial landscape, which has become dominated by conservative judges
alongside a concomitant trend towards business-friendly deregulation and
reduced enforcement of federal environmental statutes.87 Writing in 2018,
Wolf praised scholarly efforts to rework textualism into a tool amenable to
progressive causes, but concluded that such efforts are ultimately of mere
scholarly interest.88 However, as noted in the Introduction, post-Bostock,
textualism was enthusiastically discussed by other commentators as a
strategy for advancing environmental causes in the new judicial landscape.89 As seen above, and contrary to Wolf’s assertion, textualism has
never just been a matter of academic or scholarly interest. It has been
articulated and advanced within the modern conservative legal movement by real judges and practitioners. Because of textualism’s practical
connection with conservatism, and its demonstrable success in the case of
Bostock, it was reasonable to include textualism in the toolbox of environmental advocacy. However, as the next Part argues, reliance on textualism
is a deeply flawed strategy.
II.

THE PITFALLS OF TEXTUALISM

This Part presents three arguments against the textualist strategy. First, a theoretical argument that critiques the basis of the strategic
appeal of textualism to environmental advocates, namely that it is a nonpartisan tool of statutory interpretation that appeals to partisan-opponents.
This thinking buys into one of the key rationales for textualism, namely,
that it inherently promotes judicial restraint and fidelity to the law. Despite
oft-repeated claims to the contrary, textualism does not bar judicial
Take Years, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/22/climate/biden
-environment.html [https://perma.cc/L5DN-7TC6].
86
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activism or ideological influence; in fact, it easily functions as a conduit
of these things. Next, this Part will consider the ideological commitments
to which textualism is a conduit, showing how textualism as a method
favored by conservatives is part of a broader set of conservative positions
that disfavor environmental protection. Finally, this Part will indicate
these anti-environmental protection views in the record of Scalia and his
current self-identified protégés on the Court.
A.

A Key Theoretical Difficulty with Textualism

As seen above, one of the central values underlying textualism as
touted by its proponents is that textualism restrains judicial activism
and promotes the rule of law. How does textualism as an interpretive
method purport to do this? By limiting judicial consideration to the text
of the law, textualism aims to elide the role of interpretation itself, that
is, to eliminate the interpreter’s (i.e., judge’s) contribution, letting the text
speak for itself. What this means for the interpreter is that they must
simply read the text and do what it says—or, as Chief Justice John Roberts
famously said during his confirmation hearing, to act like umpires calling strikes.90 This elimination of the act of interpretation at the center
of textualism is not only paradoxical, it is unworkable. Thus, despite the
rhetoric with which textualism is often celebrated, textualism does not bar
judicial activism or ideological influence; to the contrary, it may easily
function as a conduit of judicial activism and ideology.
Cass Sunstein has illustrated the problem with textualism’s aspiration to complete objectivity with the duck-rabbit image, famously discussed
by philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations.91
Wittgenstein uses the duck-rabbit image to distinguish between “seeing
that” and “seeing as.”92 As Sunstein puts it,
If you see a table, you see that it is a table. If you see a duck
in the duck-rabbit image, you are seeing the image as a
duck. Seeing it in that way is not mandated or foreordained
by the image itself. You are doing the relevant work, even
if you are doing it automatically or unconsciously.93
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If the image itself does not determine what someone sees in it, what
explains why some people see a duck while others see a rabbit? According
to a widely accepted theory known as priming or preconditioning, “whether
people see the image as a duck or a rabbit depends on whether they find
one or another more familiar.”94
Applying these reflections on the duck-rabbit image to textualism,
Sunstein notes that oftentimes, the language of a legal text is ambiguous.95 Furthermore, just as the duck-rabbit image does not itself determine whether one sees it as a rabbit or as a duck, there is often nothing
in such ambiguous legal texts to determine how a reader should interpret
it or in what way to “see” the text’s meaning.96 The role of interpretation,
in other words, is inescapable—and with the act of interpretation, the
element of subjectivism that textualism purports to eliminate. Merely
pointing back to the text and demanding that one follow it does not solve
the matter.97 While it is a commendable goal to try to interpret the text
on its own terms and not let one’s biases govern, textualism’s core directive to “follow the text” is hollow.98
There is, then, an ironic truth in Alito’s Bostock dissent, in which
he accuses Gorsuch of sailing under a textualist pirate flag, that is, saying
that he is using textualism while in fact merely advancing society’s present
values.99 The irony is that textualism cannot help but involve the interests
of some member or segment of society. The presumption that textualism is
a bulwark against the intrusion of political or ideological interests is fundamental to the rhetorical appeal of textualism, but it is also impracticable.
B.

Ideological Inputs

If textualism is not a bar to judges’ personal and ideological contributions in the act of interpretation, a judge’s commitment to textualism
should be considered alongside other salient features of their political
leanings that inform interpretation. In the context of environmental advocacy, two features are especially salient: general conservative skepticism of environmental causes and modern conservatism’s pro-business,
anti-regulatory commitment.
94
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Modern conservatism is a coalition constituted by many strands.100
One of its central strands, libertarianism, stands opposed to overreaching
governmental control and regulation.101 Conservative opposition to environmental protection is often a proxy for opposition to governmental
overreach and regulation.102
One of the most striking examples of modern conservatism’s
libertarianism, in which individual liberties are conceived as pro-business
and free market, is former Justice Lewis Powell’s memo for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.103 The Powell memo envisions private enterprise and
conservative values to be in retreat, beleaguered by an ascendant liberalism
in culture.104 Powell gives special attention to elite institutions such as universities, which he regards as bastions of liberalism.105 The general strategy
that Powell lays out in the memo is to capture institutions currently
under liberal sway and to use them to promote a conservative perspective, including especially a pro-business stance.106 As Lawrence Glickman
points out, there was nothing new in Powell’s memo when compared with
earlier statements by conservative elites about the problems confronting
conservatism and how to address them.107 The memo was, however, influential, setting the agenda for a modern activist conservatism.108
More recently, Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have written
on how conservative ideology underlies opposition to the modern regulatory state.109 Seeing the administrative state as opposed to the rule of law
and despotic, conservative critics of the administrative state aim to dismantle it through a variety of methods.110 When it comes to the question
of whether environmental advocacy is a disfavored cause for conservatives, this context is essential. It is true that a higher percentage of
100
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people who identify as conservatives doubt or deny climate change as
compared to those who identify as liberal.111 Furthermore, former President Trump, many Republican elites, and a large sector of the Republican
Party base have vocally denied the reality of climate change over the last
few years.112 This denialism was not new with President Trump; it goes
back decades.113
Conservative opposition to environmental protection, then, may be
due to outright climate denialism, or such denialism may be combined with
a commitment to dismantling the regulatory state. The crucial point is that
an opposition to government overreach and the policy preferences flowing
from that opposition—reigning in agency power, slashing regulations—
can be de facto anti-environmental protection. The opposition is ostensibly
to government as such, and this manifests as an opposition to environmental protection.114
Importantly, one such manifestation of this anti-regulatory stance
relates back to President Trump’s judicial appointments. One of the key
players in selecting President Trump’s judicial nominees early on was
former White House Counsel Don McGahn.115 McGahn, as a liaison between the Trump administration and conservative legal groups—most
importantly the Federalist Society—pushed nominees who were probusiness and favorable to deregulation.116 Specifically, McGahn sought
candidates who shared an opposition to the administrative state.117 In
fact, this goal was paramount over selecting judges with social conservative credentials, a divergence of priorities that conflicted with another
powerful bloc of the conservative base.118 Advancing an anti-regulatory
agenda was central in selecting President Trump’s judicial nominees.119
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Scalia & His Followers

Having addressed the theoretical point that textualism as a method
of interpretation does not prevent ideological inputs in the act of interpreting a text, and then considering salient ideological inputs that inform
conservative approaches to the environment, this Section returns to
Justice Scalia, who, as seen above, was a pioneer of the new textualism.120
It also considers the torch-bearers of Scalia’s jurisprudence on the current Supreme Court and their records on the environment: Gorsuch,
Kavanaugh, and Barrett.121
Through a survey of Justice Scalia’s opinions in environmental
cases,122 Rachel Kenigsberg concludes that in the period from 1990 to
2000, Scalia seemed to adhere to his textualist principles in environmental
cases.123 By contrast, in the period from 2001 to the end of his career in
2016, Scalia increasingly abandoned textualism in environmental cases
and instead “began to rely on both legislative intent and economic arguments” in favor of limiting environmental regulation.124
Kenigsberg notes that by the end of the earlier period of Scalia’s
environmental opinions, he was already considered the worst Justice in
terms of his record on the environment.125 In the last two decades of his
time on the Court, however, Scalia’s record on the environment worsened
(i.e., from a pro-environmental standpoint).126 Scalia became increasingly
vocal in his opposition to environmental regulation, and openly called into
question the reality of climate change as a mere opinion of the Environmental Protection Agency, while characterizing the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers as an enlightened despot for their interpretation of the Clean
Water Act.127 The irony of this is that Scalia, the champion of textualism,
found it convenient to abandon textualism when his policy views were
sufficiently strong and a departure from textualist principles would aid
those views.128 This, of course, is unsurprising in light of our earlier
120
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critiques of textualism. For all Scalia’s championing of textualism as a
method of judicial restraint, textualism itself is only as good as its practitioners; it is inherently powerless to constrain judges from inserting their
own views or even abandoning the method when it is convenient.
If Scalia’s record on the environment left much to be desired by
environmental advocates, Scalia’s ideological protégés on the Court do
not inspire great confidence. Gorsuch, who sat on the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals, did not have an extensive record on the environment before
his appointment to the Supreme Court.129 Looking at the few environmental
cases available, Dan Farber concluded that the best news about Gorsuch
for environmental advocates is that Gorsuch appears to not have a strong
anti-environmental agenda.130 However, environmental groups were worried by Gorsuch’s previous rulings that set a high bar for standing for environmental groups, as well as Gorsuch’s opposition to Chevron deference.131
If Gorsuch’s record was somewhat mixed, Kavanaugh, who replaced former
Justice Kennedy on the Court,132 evinced a strong opposition to governmental regulation and specifically Obama-era environmental regulations.133
Under a Kavanaugh court, that is, a court in which Kavanaugh’s vote
would be decisive, the Environmental Protection Agency would be “badly
cramped,” unable to pursue bold action on climate change.134 Barrett’s
confirmation simply solidified these anti-regulation trends on the Supreme Court by bringing the conservative majority up to six.135 According
to a study by Adam Feldman, Barrett, who sat on the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals before her nomination to the Supreme Court, only heard
three environmental cases in her tenure.136 Nevertheless, Barrett’s overall
129
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philosophy was clear: “[Barrett is] consistently pro–big business, whether
it’s corporate cases or liability cases or discrimination cases.”137 As seen
above,138 an anti-regulatory, business-friendly stance was central to President Trump’s nominations. Given her views about regulation, Barrett’s
nomination was in line this goal.139 The uphill battle for environmental
advocates described in this Note applies not only in the lower federal
courts, but especially in the current Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION: THE USES OF TEXTUALISM
This Note started with a consideration of the current judicial
landscape, as dramatically reshaped by former President Trump’s record
number of appointments to the federal judiciary. Environmental legal advocates looked for effective ways to advocate in this new conservative
judicial landscape. One such strategy was the use of textualist arguments,
which, as the opinion in Bostock demonstrated, had the potential to bring
about victory for causes generally disfavored by conservatives. This Note
critiqued that strategy by looking at the history of textualism within the
modern conservative legal movement. Even though textualism is not inherently conservative, and though it might be combined with liberal
politics, it has historically become influential within modern conservatism and has been connected with broader conservative commitments and
values. Even though textualism is championed as a method of judicial
restraint and fidelity to the rule of law, there is nothing within textualism
to bar ideological inputs in the act of interpreting legal texts—notably,
the ideological inputs of anti-regulation and environmental skepticism.
Hence, Kagan’s declaration that “[w]e’re all textualists now” does not have
the same optimistic ring for environmental advocates post-Bostock as
some commentators suggested.
The larger lesson here might be that reliance on methods of statutory or constitutional interpretation to sway ideologically opposed judges
to one’s side is fundamentally flawed.140 Practically speaking, the best thing
to say might be that it can’t do any harm to use textualist arguments—or,
137
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as one commentator has put it, when in “Textualism Land,” do as the
textualists do.141 But even if there is a good pro-environmental textualist
argument and an environmental advocate uses such an argument,142 there
is no guarantee that the advocate’s cause will be favored by conservative
judges. Conservative judges may be receptive to textualist arguments
because of textualism’s conservative credentials, but by the same token,
other conservative commitments that appeal to a judge might override
textualism and cut against an environmental advocate.
Hence, this Note represents a word of caution, but not pessimism.
It is not sanguine about the prospects of textualist-based victory for
environmentalism, but it is not despairing. Textualism should be used
in the arsenal of legal arguments to persuade judges. However, a path to
sweeping legal victories for environmental causes likely does not lie
within weaponizing textualism. If the focus is on winning victories from
judges, the best strategy is to appoint environmentally friendly judges
rather than to rely on textualism within a hostile judiciary.143 Easier said
than done, one might object. And that is true; nevertheless, the best path
forward would be to take a page out of the Trumpian playbook and remake
the judicial landscape rather than toil within it as is.144
Just as increasing numbers of Trump-era environmental protection
rollbacks have come under review and face being undone by the Biden
administration,145 the Biden administration also has the opportunity to
aggressively appoint new judges to the federal judiciary.146 President
Biden has acknowledged the importance of the judiciary.147 Following the
death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the rapid confirmation of Amy
141
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Coney Barrett to replace Ginsburg, many outraged liberals demanded
Court reform and expansion.148 In response to these calls, President Biden
signaled the creation of a bipartisan commission to review and propose
court reform options.149 This commission ultimately expressed support for
the imposition of term limits on Supreme Court Justices, but was deeply
divided over court expansion proposals.150 Regardless of which of the
bipartisan commission’s proposals are acted upon (if any), the swift Barrett
confirmation and other hardball tactics certainly raised the importance of
the Court in the awareness of the new administration.151 In addition to calls
for expanding the Court, Democrats have signaled a more general recognition of the importance of the judiciary.152 Demonstrating this newfound
urgency, in 2021, President Biden confirmed forty federal judges (including eleven appellate judges)—the most judges confirmed in any first-year
presidency since Ronald Reagan.153 Alongside this heightened awareness
of the importance of the judiciary, President Biden has signaled a stronger
pro-environment stance than his predecessor.154 One way for President
Biden to have a lasting beneficial impact on environmental causes is to
appoint judges who are committed to environmental protection.155 It will
be important for environmental advocates to continue exerting pressure
on the Biden administration to appoint environment-friendly judges. If
this happens, there can be another tectonic shift in the federal judiciary,
one that is friendly to our environment.
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